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Getting a Second Chance: The Need for Tax Court
Jurisdiction Over IRS Denials of Relief Under Section
66
INTRODUCTION

Imagine owing thousands of dollars to the Internal Revenue
Service (the "Service") for taxes assessed on income you never
earned. For some Americans, that nightmare is a reality. The Service
claims that they owe unpaid taxes, with penalties and interest, on
income earned by their spouses or ex-spouses about which they never
knew and from which they never received any benefit. For many of
these spouses, paying the tax is financially impossible.
Fortunately, two provisions in the Internal Revenue Code (the
"Code") allow the Service to relieve such taxpayers, so-called
"innocent spouses," from this tax liability. Married taxpayers who
file ajoint return are jointly and severally liable for the taxes reported
on the return.' Under certain circumstances, section 6015 ofthe Code
relieves a taxpayer from this joint and several liability for the taxes
due on a joint return.2 In community property states, the rule ofPoe
v. Seaborn requires married taxpayers who file separate returns to
each report and assume liability for the taxes owed on one-half ofall
community income regardless of which spouse earned it.' Under
certain circumstances, section 66 ofthe Code relieves a taxpayer from
the liability imposed by Poe v. Seaborn for the taxes on one-half of
his or her spouse's income.4 Obtaining relief under these two
provisions, however, is difficult and often places the taxpayer at the
whim of the Service.
If the Service denies relief, the taxpayer may or may not have the
opportunity to seek review ofthat decision in the United States Tax
Court. For a taxpayer who filed ajoint return, the Tax Court will hear
their petition for review of a denial of relief from joint and several
liability on ajoint return under section 6015 of the Code. However,
if the taxpayer filed a separate return while living in a community
property state, the Tax Court will not review ofdenial the relief under
section 66 of the Code because Congress failed to give the Tax Court
jurisdiction over such denials. The only remaining option for these
taxpayers is litigation in the United States district court or Court of
Federal Claims. Separate filers living in non-community property
states have no need for this relief. In a non-community property state,
Copyright 2005, by LOUISIANA LAW REvIEW.
1. I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3).
2.

Id. § 6015.

3. Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 51 S. Ct. 58 (1930).
4. I.R.C. § 66.
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each spouse is liable only on the filing taxpayer's own income as
reported on the separate return.
Under the current law, innocent spouses living in non-community
property states are given greater procedural protection than those
living in community property states. The availability of Tax Court
review to some taxpayers and not others creates geographic
inequality. Congress's past efforts have evidenced an intent to strive
for geographic equalization in the tax law. In addition, although an
innocent spouse denied Tax Court review may petition the United
States district court or the Court of Federal Claims for review, the
requirement that the taxpayer pay the disputed tax before litigating in
those fora makes litigation there difficult, if not impossible, for the
innocent spouse. To remedy these problems, Congress must give all
innocent spouses denied relief by the Service a right to seek Tax
Court jurisdiction to review all denials of innocent spouse relief
whether brought under section 6015 or section 66.
This comment discusses the disparate procedural treatment
provided to taxpayers under the innocent spouse provisions of the
Code, sections 6015 and 66. Part I outlines the relief available to
taxpayers under sections 66 and 6015. Part II analyzes the
jurisdiction of the Tax Court to review denials of relief under these
sections.
This section will explain how the language and
interpretation of the innocent spouse provisions have created
disparate procedural remedies for taxpayers who are denied relief
under sections 6015 and 66. Part III illustrates the problem with a
hypothetical analyzing the treatment oftaxpayers under the provisions
protecting innocent spouses. This section will show how the innocent
spouse provisions operate differently depending on the taxpayer's
geographic location. Part IV presents the case of Whitacre v.
Commissioner,5 the real life plight of a taxpayer denied innocent
spouse relief under section 66 and Tax Court review of that denial.
Part V explores Congress's intent in limiting Tax Court jurisdiction
over innocent spouse relief. This section will establish Congress's
stated intention that the Tax Court be available to all innocent
spouses. This section will also point out that, despite its stated
intention, Congress failed to grant Tax Court jurisdiction in section
66. Part VI presents and examines arguments for expanded Tax
Court jurisdiction to review the Commissioner's denials of relief of
the effects of community property law under section 66 ofthe Code.
This section will establish Congress's attempt at geographic
equalization in the Code and explain the fundamental differences
between the Tax Court and the other fora available for determination
ofan innocent spouse claim. Finally, part VII proposes that Congress
5. Whitacre v. Conm'r, T.C. Summ. Op. 2003-21 (2003).
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give the Tax Court the ability to review the denials by the
Commissioner. Congress must give the Tax Court jurisdiction to
review all denials of innocent spouse relief by the Service to
adequately protect innocent spouses.
I. THE INNOCENT SPOUSE PROVISIONS

The Code gives married taxpayers two options for filing their
income tax return each year. Spouses may either file separate tax
returns, each reporting his or her own income, or file one joint return,
combining all income earned by both spouses.6 When married
taxpayers file separate returns, each spouse is individually liable for
the taxes owed on his or her own income.7 Spouses electing to file
jointly, however, share joint and several liability for the taxes
reported on the return.8 They also share joint and several liability on
any deficiency, interest, or penalties assessed by the Service.9
For taxpayers living under a community property regime, the rule
of Poe v. Seaborn ° sometimes imposes tax liability on the nonearning spouse. In community property states, each spouse acquires
an undivided one-half interest in all community income from the
moment the income is earned. Because each spouse owns half of the
income, the rule ofPoev. Seabornrequires each spouse to report onehalf of his own income and one-half of his spouse's income on a
separate tax return. I" Consequently each spouse is individually liable
for one-half ofthe tax on all community income, regardless ofwhich
spouse earned the income or whether the non-earning spouse received
any portion ofthe income. 2 When the spouses file ajoint return, they
remain jointly and severally liable for the entire tax liability. 3
The joint and several liability and liability for taxes on one-half
of community income can create a hardship for some taxpayers, socalled "innocent spouses." An "innocent spouse" is a taxpayer who
owes taxes on some item of income, attributable to the other spouse,
from which the taxpayer never benefitted. The Service, nonetheless,
often seeks payment of the tax liability from the innocent spouse
because the other spouse, for one reason or another, cannot be found.

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
(1971).
12.
13.

SeeI.R.C. § 1;Id.§6013(a).
See id.§ l(a)(1).
Id. § 6013(d)(3).
Id.
Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 51 S. Ct. 58 (1930).
Id. See also United States v. Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190, 91 S. Ct. 1763
Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 51 S. Ct. 58 (1930).
I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3).
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Two provisions ofthe Code provide reliefto spouses saddled with
a tax liability on income about which they never knew and from
which they never benefitted. The first provision, section 6015 ofthe
Code, applies to a taxpayer who filed ajoint tax return and later seeks
relief from joint and several liability for the taxes owed.14 The
second, Section 66 of the Code, relieves a spouse in a community
property state who filed a separate tax return from liabilit' for taxes
owed on community income earned by the other spouse.'
A. Section 6015: Relieffrom Jointand Several Tax Liabilityfor
JointFilers
Because married taxpayers who file a joint return are jointly and
severally liable for the tax due on the income earned by both spouses,
either spouse may be required to pay the entire amount.' 6 Section
6015 gives taxpayers several
different ways to seek relief from this
17
joint and several liability.
Under section 6015(b)(1), a spouse requesting relief will not be
liable for tax attributable to an understatement ofincome made on the
tax return if: (1) a joint return was filed for the taxable year in
question; (2) an understatement oftax was made on the return, which
is attributable to an erroneous item ofthe other spouse; (3) the spouse
requesting relief did not know or have reason to know of the
understatement; (4) holding the requesting spouse liable for the tax
deficiency would be inequitable; and (5) the requesting spouse files
for relief within two years ofthe beginning of collection activities. 8
If all of these requirements are met, the statute states that the
requesting spouse "shall be relieved of liability for tax (including
interest, penalties, and other amounts) . . . attributable to such
understatement."19 Meeting every requirement, section 6015(b)(1)
guarantees relief from joint and several liability for the tax, interest,
and penalties with respect to the item of income that caused the
understatement.20
However, many innocent spouses fail to meet every requirement
ofsection 6015(b)(1). Thus, section 6015 provides other avenues for
relief from joint and several liability. Even if the requesting spouse

14.

Id. § 6015.

15. Id.§ 66.

16. Id. § 6013(d)(3).
17. Id. § 6015.
18. Id. § 6015(b)(1).
19. Id. § 6015(b)(1)(E).
20. Id.
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knew of the understatement, the spouse can still seek partial relief
from liability on the tax attributable to the understatement. 2' If the
taxpayer knew or should have known of the understatement, but can
establish that he or she did not know and had no reason to know of
the extent of the understatement, she will remain liable only for the
tax attributable to the portion ofthe understatement about which she
knew or should have known.22
Where a taxpayer is no longer married to, is legally separated
from, or is no longer living with, the person with whom the taxpayer
filed the joint return, section 6015(c) allows the taxpayer to elect
"separate liability."23 A taxpayer qualifies for "separate liability"
under section 6015(c) ifhe or she is no longer married to, or is legally
separated from, the spouse with whom the return was filed, or if the
spouses or former spouses have been living in separate households for
at least twelve months preceding the election.2 A transfer of assets
in an effort to commit fraud or actual knowledge ofthe item giving
rise to the deficiency will invalidate the election.25 If the taxpayer
elects separate liability, and relief is available, the spouses generally
will be treated as if they had filed separated returns for the taxable
year in question. 26
Finally, if no relief is available to a taxpayer under sections
6015(b) or (c), the taxpayer may petition the Service for equitable
relief fromjoint and several liability.27 The Service has the discretion
to grant equitable relief if, "taking into account all the facts and
circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the individual liable for any
unpaid tax or any deficiency.... ,28
B. Section 66: Relieffrom the Effects of Community PropertyLaw
for SeparateFilersin Community PropertyStates
Section 66 offers relief similar to section 6015 for innocent
spouses living in community property states who are subject to the
rule of Poe v. Seaborn.2 9 Married taxpayers who file ajoint return are
treated equally under the Code; their income is combined, and the
are jointly and severally liable for the resulting tax liability.%
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. § 6015(b)(2).
Id.
Id. § 6015(c).
Id. § 6015(c)(3)(A)(i).
Id. § 6015(c)(3)(A)(ii).
Id.§ 6015(d).
Id. § 6015(f).
Id. § 6015(f)(1).
Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 51 S. Ct. 58 (1930).
I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3).
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However, married taxpayers living under a community property
regime who decide to file separately must follow the income splitting
rule ofPoe v. Seaborn.31 In Poev. Seaborn,the Supreme Court ofthe
United States held that each spouse must report one-half of all
community income on his or her separate return.32 Under Poe v.
Seaborn, each spouse is personally liable for the tax on one-half of
the community income, regardless of whether the reporting spouse
knows about, or receives any of,the community income earned by the
other spouse.33
Section 66 offers some relief to taxpayers from tax liability
created by the rule of Poe v. Seaborn. Section 66(a) outlines four
elements, which, if met, reclassify the income of the spouses for the
taxable year in question.34 The income of the taxpayers will be
treated as section 879(a) income for any taxable year if: (1) the
spouses were married at any time during a calendar year, but lived
apart for the entire year; (2) did not file a joint return for any taxable
year beginning or ending in the calendar year, (3) one or both of the
spouses had earned community income, and (4) none of that earned
income is transferred between the spouses.3 5
Even under section 879(a), taxpayers who meet all four
requirements of section 66(a) receive only partial relief from the tax
liability on community income.36 Section 879 changes the treatment
of community income arising from three sources.37 Earned income,38
excluding income from a trade or business and a partner's share of
partnership income, is treated as the income of the earning spouse.39
Section 1402(a)(5) is applied to income from a trade or business or
a spouse's share of partnership income.4° Section 1402(a)(5) treats
all income and deductions from the operation of a trade or business
as income of the spouse who exercises substantial control over the
31. Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 51 S. Ct. 58 (1930).
32. Id.
33. Susan Kalinka, Taxation ofCommunity Income: It is timefor Congressto
OverridePoe v. Seaborn, 58 La. L. Rev. 73, 75 (1997).

34. I.R.C. § 66(a).
35. Id.
36. Id. § 879(a).
37. Id.
38. The Code defines "earned income" as:
wages, salaries, or professional fees, and other amounts received as
compensation for personal services actually rendered, but does not include
that part of the compensation derived by the. taxpayers for personal
services rendered by him to a corporation which represents a distribution
of earnings or profits rather than a reasonable allowance as compensation
for the personal services actually rendered.
Id. § 911(d)(2).
39. Id. § 879(a)(1).
40. Id. § 879(a)(2).
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trade or business.4 ' Under section 1402(a)(5), all of a partner's
distributive share of partnership income is the self-employment
income of the partner.42 None of that income is attributed to the
partner's spouse.43 Finally, under section 879(a), any community
income derived from the separate property of one spouse is treated as
the income of the owner-spouse.' Section 879(a) provides that all
community income outside of these three enumerated categories is
treated according to the governing community property law.45
Therefore, section 879 may not completely solve the innocent spouse
problem because all other income, including income from community
property, continues to be allocated between the spouses according to
the applicable community property law.46
Like the requirements prescribed for relief from joint and several
liability, taxpayers sometimes have trouble meeting every
requirement of section 66(a). For this reason, section 66 also offers
other avenues of relief from the effects of Poe v. Seaborn. First,
Section 66(b) allows the Service to disregard the effects of
community property law where one spouse treats some item of
community income as if he or she is solely entitled to the income and
does not notify the other spouse of the income before the due date for
filing an income tax return.47 However, the language of section 66(b)
says that the Service "may" disregard the community property law.4
Section 66(b) does not require the Service to disregard community
property law even where these circumstances are present. Section
66(c) relieves a spouse of liability from tax on community income
earned by the other spouse if the non-earning spouse does not file a
joint return, does not include an item of community income
attributable to the other spouse on his or her separate return, and does
not know or have reason to know of the item of community income,
if including that item in the spouse's gross income would be
inequitable.49
Finally, the statute allows the taxpayer to seek equitable relief. If
the taxpayer fails to meet the criteria for all other avenues of relief,
the last sentence of section 66(c) allows the Service to grant relief
from the rule ofPoe v. Seabornto a taxpayer if the inclusion ofsome

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. § 1402(a)(5)(A).
Id. § 1402(a)(5)(B).
Id.
Id. § 879(a)(3).
Id. § 879(a)(4).
Id.
Id. § 66(b).

48. Id.
49. Id. § 66(c).
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item of community income in the taxpayer's taxable income would
be inequitable.5"
11.

TAx COURT JURISDICTION OVER CLAIMS FOR REVIEW UNDER

SECTIONS

66 AND 6015

Relief under both section 6015 and section 66 is available by
requesting it from the Service.5 Except for the elective provisions,
the Service has the discretion whether to grant or deny relief to a
particular taxpayer based on that taxpayer's circumstances. 3 If the
taxpayer is denied relief, he or she may want to request review ofthat
denial from the United States Tax Court. However, the Tax Court
may or may not have jurisdiction to review the denial of relief.
The Tax Court is a legislative court created by Congress under
Article I of the Constitution. 4 Without Article Ill powers, the Tax
Court is a court of limited jurisdiction and can only exercise
jurisdiction to the extent that it has been granted by Congress.55
Section 6015, the provision offering relief from joint and several
liability, expressly confers jurisdiction upon the Tax Court to
determine whether a taxpayer merits relief from joint and several
liability under sections 6015(b) or (c).5 6 Under the statutory grant,
the Tax Court has asserted broad jurisdiction to decide relief available
to a taxpayer under section 6015 whether raised by the taxpayer as an
affirmative defense in a collection or deficiency proceeding or in a
direct appeal by the taxpayer from a denial ofrelief by the Service.57
Section 66, offering relief from the rule of Poe v. Seaborn, contains
no parallel language granting Tax Court jurisdiction.58 The court has
refused jurisdiction to review denials ofrelief from the effects ofPoe
v. Seaborn under section 66, except where it already has jurisdiction
over the taxpayer's liability for a taxable year under another section
of the Code.59

50. Id.
51. Id. § 6015; id.§ 66.
52. Sections 6015 (b)(1) and (c) are mandatory provisions. If the taxpayer
meets all requirements of the section, the Service must grant them the relief
available. Id. §§ 6015(b)(1)-(c).
53. Id. § 6015; id. § 66.
54. Leandra Lederman, Equity and the Article I Court. Is the Tax Court's
Exercise of EquitablePowers Constitutional?,5 Fla. Tax Rev. 357, 359 (2001).
55. Bernal v. Comm'r, 120 T.C. 102, 107 (2003).
56. I.R.C. § 6015(e).
57. See Ewing v. Comm'r, 118 T.C. 494 (2002); Butler v. Comm'r, 114 T.C.
276 (2000); Fernandez v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 324 (2000).
58. I.R.C. § 66.
59. Beck v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo 2001-198 (2001).
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A. Jurisdictionover Denials ofRelieffrom JointandSeveral
Liability UnderSection 6015
Section 6015(e) provides for limited Tax Court jurisdiction to
review denials of relief under section 6015(b) or (c).6" The language
of section 6015(e) only expressly gives the Tax Court jurisdiction to
consider whether relief is available to the taxpayer when a deficiency
has been asserted against the taxpayer and the taxpayer has elected
relief under section 6015(b) or (c). 61 Nevertheless, the Tax Court has
asserted jurisdiction beyond these textual limitations.62
The language of the statute clearly grants jurisdiction to the Tax
Court to review denials of relief where the taxpayer elected and was
denied relief from joint and several liability under section 6015(b) or
separate liability under section 6015(C). 63 However, section 6015(e)
does not expressly provide the Tax Court with jurisdiction to
determine equitable relief available under section 6015(f). In a series
ofrecent cases, the Tax Court has, nonetheless, claimed jurisdiction
over all denials of relief under section 6015 whether raised as a
defense in a deficiency proceeding or brought by the taxpayer in a
stand-alone petition. 64
The court has assumed authority to review a denial ofa claim for
equitable relief under section 6015(f) raised as an affirmative defense
in a deficiency proceeding where the requesting taxpayer also elected
relief from joint and several liability under section 6015(b) and
possibly separate liability under section 6015(c). 65 In Butler v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the court relied on the
independent jurisdiction that it had over the deficiency proceeding,
not on the jurisdiction given to review denials of relief in section
6015(e).66 When a taxpayer files a petition for redetermination of a
deficiency, the court has jurisdiction over the taxpayer's entire tax
liability for the taxable year, including decisions on all defenses
60. I.R.C. § 6015(e).
61. Section 6015(e) reads (in pertinent part):
(e) Petition for review by Tax Court.(1) In general.-In the case of an individual against whom a deficiency has been
asserted and who elects to have subsection (b) or (c) apply(A) In general.-In addition to any other remedy provided by law, the individual
may petition the Tax Court (and the Tax Court shall have jurisdiction) to determine
the appropriate relief available to the individual under this section ....

Id.

62. Ewing v. Comm'r, 118 T.C. 494 (2002).
63. I.R.C. § 6015(e).
64. Butler v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 276 (2000); Fernandez v. Comm'r, 114 T.C.
324 (2000); Ewing, 118 T.C. 494.
65. Butler, 114 T.C. 276.
66. Id; I.R.C. § 6213.
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raised.67 Thus, the court can review the denial ofequitable relief from
joint and several liability because it already has jurisdiction over the
deficiency proceeding for the taxable year in question.68 To decide
cases like Butler, the Tax Court does not have to rely on the
jurisdiction given it under section 6015(e). The court may instead
rely on the jurisdiction it already has over the taxpayer and the tax
liability for the year in the deficiency proceeding.
In another case, the Tax Court asserted jurisdiction to review a
denial of equitable relief under section 6015(f), not only as an
affirmative defense in a deficiency proceeding, but also in a "standalone" proceeding, a proceeding brought by the taxpayer against the
Service seeking innocent spouse relief, brought under section
6015(e)(1)(A). 69 In Fernandezv. CommissionerofInternalRevenue,
the court interpreted the language of section 6015(e) to provide
jurisdiction to review all denials of relief under section 6015: relief
from joint and several liability under section 6015(b), separate
liability under section 6015(c), or equitable relief under section
6015(f).7" The court interpreted the phrase "under this section" in
section 6015(e) to include denials of relief under all of the
subsections, not only relief from joint and several liability under
section 6015(b) and the election of separate liability under section
6015(c). 7 1 The court placed one important limitation on its assertion
ofjurisdiction over requests for review of denials of equitable relief
from joint and several liability. The court required that the taxpayer
requesting review of a denial of equitable relief in a stand-alone
petition must have also elected, and been denied, relief under section
6015(b) or (c) to satisfy the language in section 6015(e)(1) before the
court would assert jurisdiction."
The Service acquiesced in the Fernandezdecision, crediting the
court's interpretation of the statute as "reasonable.,1 3 In its
acquiescence, the Service also declared that when a taxpayer had met
the requirements of section 6015(e), it would not contest the Tax
Court's assertion ofjurisdiction to review the taxpayer's request for
equitable relief." Later, in a Chief Counsel Notice, the Service
expanded its position.75 The Service explained that it would no
longer contest the jurisdiction of the Tax Court, the United States
67.
68.
69.

I.R.C. § 6213.
Butler, 114 T.C. 276.
Fernandez v. Comr'r, 114 T.C. 324 (2000).

70. Id.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id.
Id.
A.O.D. 2000-06 (May 11, 2000).
Id.

75.

Chief Counsel Notice N(35)000-338, UIL 6015.00-00 (June 5, 2000).
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district courts, the bankruptcy courts, or the Court of Federal Claims
to review denials of equitable relief under section 6015(f) whether
or
76
not the taxpayer made an election under section 6015(b) or (c).
After Butler and Fernandezwere decided and the Chief Counsel
Notice was released, Congress amended section 6015(e) in the
Consolidated Appropriations Act of2001, adding the phrase "against
whom a deficiency has been asserted" to the prefatory language in
section 6015(e)( 1).77 The amendment raised the question of whether
the Tax Court could still assume jurisdiction over a denial of relief in
a non-deficiency situation.
The Tax Court resolved this question by asserting jurisdiction
78
over all denials of innocent spouse relief in Ewingv. Commissioner.
In Ewing, the court held that the amendment to section 6015 did not
preclude Tax Court jurisdiction in a non-deficiency proceeding. The
court assumed jurisdiction over a taxpayer's stand-alone petition
requesting review of a denial ofequitable relief under section 6015(f)
even where the taxpayer did not also request relief under sections
66(b) or (c).7 9 The court determined that the amendment merely
clarified the appropriate time for a taxpayer to make an election for
relief under the section.8" The Tax Court pointed out that every
request for equitable reliefunder section 6015(f) necessarily requires
a decision on all other avenues of relief available under the section.8
Thus, the court removed the requirement that the taxpayer specifically
elect the relief available under sections 6015(b) and (c).82 After
Ewing, the Tax Court has asserted jurisdiction to review all denials
of relief from joint and several liability, denials of an election of
separate liability, and denials of equitable relief to joint filers under
section 6015 whether raised as a defense in a deficiency proceeding
brought by the Service or in a separate stand-alone petition brought
by a taxpayer.
B. Jurisdictionover DenialsofRelieffrom the Rule ofPoe v.
Seaborn Under Section 66
The Tax Court has determined that it has much more limited
jurisdiction to review denials of relief under section 66. Section 66
does not contain any language giving the Tax Court jurisdiction over
76.
77.
(2000);
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id.
The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2001, Pub. L. 106-554 § l(a)(7)
I.R.C. § 6015(e). For the language of section 6015(e), see supranote 55.
Ewing v. Comm'r, 118 T.C. 494 (2002).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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denials of relief under the section.83 In a case similar to Butler,84 the
Tax Court claimed jurisdiction over a denial of equitable relief under
section 66(c) in a deficiency proceeding.85 Citing Butler, the court
found that it hadjurisdiction to review denials of relief from the rule of
Poe v. Seaborn where it had a separate, independent basis of
jurisdiction under some other provision of the Code.86 The Service
acquiesced in the decision. 7
The court has refused to assertjurisdiction over a taxpayer's standalone petition for Tax Court review ofrelief from community property
income.8 Because section 66 does not contain a provision expressly
granting Tax Court jurisdiction, the court claims it is powerless to
review denials ofrelief under section 66 absent an independent basis of
jurisdiction. 89 Thus, the court has determined that it does not have
jurisdiction to hear denials of relief from the rule of Poe v. Seaborn
under section 66 brought by the taxpayer in a stand-alone petition.9"
The unavailability of review is particularly burdensome to taxpayers
who filed a separate return and correctly included their full share of
community income. Because the taxpayers correctly determine their
tax liabilities and report the full amount of tax owed on their tax
returns, they have no deficiency.9 The Commissioner will never bring
a deficiency action against them, and these taxpayers will never have
the chance to bring their claims before the Tax Court.92
Where a taxpayer lives and how he or she chooses to file his or her
annual income tax return will determine whether the Service's denial
ofthe taxpayer's request for innocent spouse relief can be reviewed by
the Tax Court. As the hypothetical situation in the next section
illustrates, whether the Tax Court will have jurisdiction to review
denials of innocent spouse relief by the Service can have a significant
impact on a taxpayer seeking innocent spouse relief.
III. ILLUSTRATING THE PROBLEM FACING INNOCENT SPOUSES:
HYPOTHETICAL

A

Two years ago, on January 17, Marian James came home to find
her husband's things gone and a note on the dining room table
83.
84.
85.
86.

I.R.C. § 66.
Butler v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 276 (2000).
Beck v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo 2001-198 (2001).
Id.

87.

A.O.D. 2002-05 (Dec. 9, 2002).

88. Bemal v. Comm'r, 120 T.C. 102 (2003); Whitacre v. Comm'r, T.C. Summ.
Op. 2003-21 (2003).
89. Bernal, 120 T.C. 102; Whitacre, T.C. Summ. Op. 2003-21.
90. Whitacre, T.C. Summ. Op. 2003-21.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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explaining that he had left her for another woman. About a year later,
Marian's husband moved to an island in the Caribbean. Marian, a
teacher at a small private school earning an annual salary of $10,000,
struggled to make ends meet without the income from her husband's
very profitable dermatology practice. Throughout her married life,
Marian had grown accustomed to her husband depositing the large
earnings from his practice into theirjoint bank account every month for
her to spend as she pleased. When he left, he cleaned out their joint
bank account, but left halfofhis earnings from the first half ofJanuary
(approximately $4,000) in the bank account for her use. Also,
throughout the year after he left, Marian received several small checks
in the mail from her husband "to help out with the kids and other
expenses."
For several years, Marian's husband had worked late a couple of
nights a month to host after-hours "Botox Parties" in his office. Marian
knew about the parties and had even attended one or two.
Unbeknownst to Marian, however, her husband also performed once
monthly Botox parties in the home of a wealthy patient. The patient
paid him $50,000 in cash for each party. Marian's husband put a
portion of this money into their joint bank account each month. The
parties continued after he moved out until his move out ofthe country.
He never reported any of this cash income to the Service. 93 The
Service, however, has learned about the unreported cash income and
wants to recover the taxes owed for the year her husband left, but they
cannot find Marian's husband to recover from him.
A. SeparatePropertyState; SeparateReturns
Assume that Marian and her husband lived in a separate property
state and always filed separate returns. Marian is only liable for the
taxes attributable to her earned income, reported on her separate
return. 94 The Service cannot recover from Marian any of the
outstanding taxes owed by her husband on his "under-the-table" Botox
income.
B. Separateor Community PropertyState; JointReturn
Assume that Marian and her husband filed ajoint return in the year
that he left. Taxpayers filing joint returns are jointly and severally
liable for the taxes owed.95 This means that the Service can recover the
93. The Code requires a taxpayer to report all cash income received from a
trade or business greater than $10,000 in one or multiple related transactions.
I.R.C. § 60501(a).
94. Id. § 1(a).
95. Id. § 6013(d)(3).
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taxes owed on her husband's unreported income from Marian.
Fortunately for Marian, section 6015 of the Code Provides relief from
joint and several liability for qualifying taxpayers. 6 Marian, however,
probably will not qualify for relief under section 6015(b) because she
knew that her husband sometimes performed these Botox parties for
patients. Innocent spouse relief under section 6015(b) is not available
to a spouse who knew or had reason to know that the other spouse
earned income that was not reported on the spouse's joint return.9 7
Section 6015(c) allows a taxpayer to elect separate liability for the
taxable year if he or she is no longer married, is legally separated, or
has lived apart from his or her spouse for at least twelve months. 98
Marian, depending on her circumstances at the time the Service comes
calling, may or may not meet these requirements to qualify for separate
liability under section 6015(c). Even if relief is unavailable under
sections 6015(b) or (c), Marian can petition the Service for equitable
relief from joint and several liability on the grounds that it would be
inequitable to hold her liable for the tax on her husband's unreported
income.99 If the Service denies her request, she can petition the Tax
Court for review ofthat decision and hopefully get a different result."
Section 6015 applies whether Marian lives in a separate property or
community property state and relief will be given without regard to
community property law.''
C. Community PropertyState; SeparateReturns
Now, assume that Marian and her husband lived in a community
property state, but because her husband was living with someone else,
Marian elected to file a separate return in the year ofhis leaving. Her
attorney advised her that she must report one-half of all community
income on her income tax return. 0 2 With this knowledge, Marian
called her husband and asked him for his total taxable earnings for the
year. He told her he earned $400,000, but he did not include the cash
income from the once-monthly parties (an extra $300,000 for the
year). In return, she shared her total income for the year along with
the amount withheld from her paycheck for taxes. Because Dr. James
practices dermatology as a sole proprietor, no taxes were withheld
from his income. Dr. James also told Marian that he had not made

96.

Id. § 6015.

97. Id. §6015(b)(1)(C).
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. § 6015(c).
Id. § 6015(f).
Id. § 6015(e).
Treas. Reg. § 1-6015 (2003).
Poe v. Seabom, 282 U.S. 101, 51 S. Ct. 58 (1930).
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estimated tax payments for the year.0 3 Marian filled out a tax return
listing half of her husband's income and half of her own income and
claiming a credit for the half of the taxes withheld from her
paychecks. She could not, however, find the cash needed to pay the
tax on the full amount.""° Marian's husband filed a return reflecting
the other half ofthe community income and paid the tax owed on that
half. He did not report the $300,000 in cash he made at the Botox
parties.
Under these circumstances, Marian is liable for the taxes on onehalf of her income and one-half ofher husband's income, as reported
on her return. She is also liable for the amount of tax owed on half
of the unreported $300,000. Section 66 of the Code contains a
provision designed to protect a spouse living in a community property
state who files a separate return from liability for the tax on one-half
of the community income earned by the other spouse. Unfortunately
for Marian, she likely will not qualify for relief under section 66.
Section 66 affords relief to a spouse who lives apart from the other
spouse for the entire calendar year."0 5 Because Marian's husband
lived with her for the first two weeks of the year, she would not
qualify. In addition, the statute requires that no earned community
income be transferred between the spouses. 106 Marian's husband left
her a portion of his January earnings when he left, and he sent
sporadic, small checks "to help out" throughout the year. Income was
transferred, therefore, Marian will not qualify for relief under section
66. Section 66(b) also allows the Service to disallow the advantage
of community property law to an earning spouse who acts as if he or
she is solely entitled to the income and does not inform the other
spouse ofthe amount of the income to report on his or her income tax
return.' Section 66(b) gives the Service the discretion whether or
not to allow the taxpayer to disregard community property laws and
the rule ofPoe v. Seaborn.'08 Because Dr. James told Marian how
much he made for the year, the Service is unlikely to allow her to
disregard community property laws under section 66(b).
As stated previously, section 66(c) relieves a spouse of liability
for the tax on one-half of an item ofcommunity income earned by the
103. Under section 3402 of the Internal Revenue Code, employers must
withhold income tax from each employee's paycheck which goes toward payment
of the tax due at the end of the year. The requirement applies only to employers
withholding from the wages of employees. I.R.C. § 3402.
104. Ifshe had been able to report only her income, Marian would have received
a tax refund for the year because of the amounts removed from her paycheck.
105. I.R.C. § 66(a)(2)(A).
106. Id. § 66(a)(4).
107. Id. § 66(b).
108. Hardy v. Comm'r, 181 F.3d 1002, 1007 (9th Cir. 1999).
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other spouse ifthe spouse requesting relief can establish that he or she
did not know, and had no reason to know, of an item of community
income, and taking into account all the facts and circumstances it is
inequitable to include the item of income in the requesting spouse's
gross income. 0 9 Marian will not qualify for reliefunder section 66(c)
because she knew that her husband was hosting Botox parties, so she
should have known that income would result from these parties." 0 If
Marian could qualify under section 66(c), she would only be
permitted to exclude from her income items of Dr. James's earnings
for which she had no reason to know. 11 '
Her only remaining option would be to request equitable relief
from the Service." 2 If she is denied relief, however, she will not be
able to appeal the decision to the Tax Court, as she could if she had
filed a joint return.
Although Marian is a fictional character, some real American
taxpayers face the same concerns that she faced. They have been left
liable for taxes on income earned and used by their spouse. They
have been denied innocent spouse relief by the Service and want to
turn to the Tax Court for review, but the Tax Court cannot review the
denial because it does not have jurisdiction. Mary Ann Whitacre was
one taxpayer who found herself in this situation.
IV.

WHITACRE V. COMMISSIONER OFINTERNAL REVENUE:
LIFE INNOCENT SPOUSE

A REAL

After the stress of a separation and divorce, Mary Ann Whitacre
found herself in another struggle, this time with the Internal Revenue
Service." 3 In the year that she separated from her husband, Ms.
Whitacre filed a tax return for the year 1995, prepared by her CPA,
under the status, "married, filing separate."" Because Ms. Whitacre
and her husband lived in Texas, a community property state, federal
law required each of them to report their one-half share of all
community income earned during the year on their tax returns. 115 In
109.

I.R.C. § 66(c).

110. See McGee v. Comm'r, 979 F.2d 66 (5th Cir. 1992) (taxpayer who knew
her husband earned income from a dental practice was ineligible for relief under
section 66 because she knew of the item of community income); Roberts v.
Comm'r, T.C. Memo 1987-391 (1987) (taxpayer who knew about her husband's
involvement in real estate transaction which generated income did not qualify for
relief under section 66, even though she did not know the exact amount of her

husband's income, because she knew of the income).
111. Roberts, T.C. Memo 1987-391.
112. Id.
113. Whitacre v. Comm'r, T.C. Summ. Op. 2003-21 (2003).
114.

Id.

115. Id.; Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 51 S. Ct. 58 (1930).
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accordance with this requirement, Ms. Whitacre included as income
one-half of her wages and one-half of her husband's earned income
(resulting in approximately $111,000 oftaxable income)." 6 Based on
this income, Ms. Whitacre reported a tax liability of $24,737, which,
when reduced by half of her withholdings resulted in a tax balance
due of $20,983.' 7 In the year in question, Ms. Whitacre's personal
income was only $37,000, and about $7,500 of that was withheld by
her employer for taxes during the year." 8 Thus, Ms. Whitacre's tax
liability due for the year amounted to over two-thirds of her take
just $6,000 to
home pay." 9 Paying the tax would have left her with
20
pay all of her living expenses for the entire year.
In 2001, Ms. Whitacre filed with the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue a Request for Innocent Spouse Relief (Form 8857) for the
taxable year 1995 asking for equitable relief from the tax she owed on
her ex-husband's share of community income. 21 She alleged that,
had she not been required to claim half ofhis income, she would have
received a tax refund for the year based on her earnings and
withholdings. 2 2 She further alleged that she did not have use of any
of her ex-husband's income even
23 though under community property
law, she owned a half interest.
When the Commissioner denied Ms. Whitacre's request for
equitable relief under section 66(c), she filed a petition with the Tax
Court. 24 The Tax Court dismissed her case because it does not have
jurisdiction to review the Commissioner's decision to deny relief
under section 66 in a stand-alone petition. 25 Ms. Whitacre's only
remaining option was to pay the tax and sue for a refund in federal
district court.
Because Ms. Whitacre chose to file a separate tax return to escape
the joint and several liability imposed on filers ofjoint returns, she
could not seek relief from joint and several liability under section
6015. If she had filed a joint return, she could have requested relief
under section 6015, and the Tax Court would have hadjurisdiction to

116. Whitacre,T.C. Summ. Op. 2003-21.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. IfMs. Whitacre had lived in a non-community property state, she could
have filed a separate return and reported only her own taxable income during the
year. The tax withheld from her paycheck would have been credited toward her tax
liability, and she may have received a tax refund for the year.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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hear her petition seeking review of the Commissioner's decision to
deny relief.
Ms. Whitacre was punished because she tried to comply with the
law. The Tax Court would have had jurisdiction to review the denial of
innocent spouse relief as a defense raised in a deficiency proceeding.
Because Ms. Whitacre reported on her return, in accordance with the
law, one-halfofall community income, her return showed no deficiency,
so the Service would never bring a deficiency proceeding against her. If
she had tried to report only her own earned income, the Commissioner
likely would have assessed a deficiency, and she could have asked the
Tax Court to consider her request for relief from the effects of
community property law.' 26
Ms. Whitacre is not alone in her plight. Other innocent spouses
living in community property states will find themselves in the same
situation, saddled with a tax burden they cannot afford to pay, with no
where to turn for relief
V. CONGRESS'S INTENT INLIITING TAX COURT JURISDICTION

In the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of
1998,27 Congress addressed the innocent spouse problem for the first
time since 1984.118 Congress examined the innocent spouse provision,
then found in section 6013 of the Code.2 9 Congress significantly
expanded the relief available, made that relief easier to obtain, and
moved the provision to newly created section 6015.13

In making the

changes, Congress was concerned with making innocent spouse relief
available to more taxpayers and allowing partial innocent spouse relief
in appropriate cases. ' Congress also believed "that all taxpayers should
have access to the Tax Court in resolving disputes concerning their status
as an innocent spouse."' 32 Prior to the changes in 1998, a taxpayer could
contest the Secretary's denial of innocent spouse relief, but the Tax
Court did not necessarily have jurisdiction to review all denials of
relief.133 The forum in which the taxpayer could contest the Service's
denial of relief was determined by whether the Service had asserted an
126. Id.
127. Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L.
No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 739.
128. Joint Committee on Taxation, Present Law and Background Relating to Tax
Treatment of "Innocent Spouses," JCX-6-98 (1998).
129. Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L.
No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 739.
130. Id.
131. General Explanation ofTax Legislation Enacted in 1998, [Joint Committee
Print] 105th Congress, 2d Session, JCS-6-98.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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against the taxpayer or the taxpayer was seeking a
underpayment
134
refund.
Prior to revising the innocent spouse provision in 1998, Congress
considered a report from the Treasury Department on Joint Liability and
Innocent Spouse Issues.' 35 In his testimony, Treasury Assistant
Secretary Donald Lubick highlighted the recommendations of the
Treasury Department including a recommendation that Congress expand
the taxpayer's procedural opportunity to obtain reliefunder the innocent
spouse provisions by making access to the Tax Court routinely
available.' 36 The plan presented by the Treasury Department for
modifications to the
3 7 innocent spouse rules included an ultimate remedy
in the Tax Court.
Despite the report of the Treasury Department and Congress's own
admission that it believed taxpayers should be given access to the Tax
Court, section 6015(e) limited the Tax Court's jurisdiction to denials of
elections by the taxpayer ofinnocent spouse reliefunder section 6015(b)
or separate liability under section 6015(c). 3 ' Congress made no changes
to section 66. Therefore, the Tax Court continues to lack jurisdiction to
review denials of relief from the rule of Poe v. Seaborn. Congress,
however, was silent about why it chose to limit Tax Court jurisdiction.
Congress expressed its belief that all taxpayers should have access to
the Tax Court for review ofa denial ofinnocent spouse relief,but failed
to amend section 66 to ensure that access to innocent spouses in
community property states. Congress must give jurisdiction to the Tax
Court to review denials ofrelief under section 66, so that all taxpayers,
regardless of where they live, will have the same opportunity to request
review from the Tax Court. Granting Tax Court review of all denials
will give all taxpayers the same opportunity for review and ensure that
the Service's actions will be subject to review in some forum.
VI. WHY CONGRESS SHOULD GRANT TAx COURT JURISDICTION
OVER DENIALS UNDER SECTION 66

A. The Revenue Act of 1948: Congress's Attempt at Geographic
Equalization
One of the fundamental precepts of tax law in the United States is
that similarly situated taxpayers should be taxed similarly.139 When
134. Id.

135. Joint Liability and Its Impact on Innocent Spouses, Testimony ofTreasury

Assistant Secretary (Tax Policy) Donald C. Lubick, House Ways and Means
Subcommittee on Oversight, Feb. 24, 1998, 1998 WL 110873 (F.D.C.H.).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. I.R.C. § 6015(e).
139. Kalinka, supranote 33, at 77.
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Congress passed the Revenue Act of 1948, Congress evidenced its intent
to honor this precept. The Act was designed to equalize the tax
treatment of all married taxpayers, regardless of their 4geographical
location and the unique state laws under which they live.1
Prior to 1948, the income-splitting rule of Poe v. Seaborn gave
married taxpayers in community property states a tax advantage over
married taxpayers in non-community property states. Under the rule,
married taxpayers in community property states were splitting their
income and each reporting one-half.'14 With no joint tax returns
allowed, the graduated income tax rate applied to each taxpayer
individually.'
Because the husband's income was usually much
greater than the wife's, the income, when split between the husband
and wife, was taxed in a lower tax bracket than if all of the income
were attributed to the husband. Attempting to achieve the same lower
tax liability for their own residents, many non-community property
states began to adopt community property regimes. 43 To halt the
changes in long-standing marital property regimes for purely tax
reasons and to abate the consequences of hasty changes in the
property law of the states, Congress enacted the Revenue Act of
1948.144 The Act allowed married taxpayers to file a single, joint
return and pay taxes based on a separate, lower tax schedule
applicable only to married taxpayers filing jointly. Congress gave
married taxpayers living in common-law property states the same
reduction in tax liability enjoyed by married taxpayers in community
property states under the rule ofPoe v. Seaborn.14 In addition to the
change in the income tax, the Act also made changes to the gift and
estate taxes to reflect the differences in the treatment of these items
1 46
under state property law and to equalize the federal tax treatment.
Both the Senate and House Reports on the Revenue Act reflect
that Congress intended to equalize the tax treatment with the 1948
Act. Both reports state, "Equalization is provided for the tax burdens
of married couples in common-law and community-property states.
The bill corrects existing inequalities under the estate and gift taxes,
as well as the individual income tax.' 47 Seeking geographical
140. The Revenue Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-471.
141. Id.
142. The joint return did not exist until 1948. 3 Mertens Law of Fed. Income
Tax'n § 19:02.
143. Id.§ 19:02.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. S. Rep. No. 1013, 1948 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1163; H.R. Rep. No. 80-1274, 1948
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1258. (The House report contains the phrase, "with committee
amendments to be offered on the floor," after "The bill..." in the second sentence
ofthe paragraph. This phrase is not included in the Senate report. The paragraphs
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equalization, Congress intended that taxpayers, no matter where they
choose to live within the United States, would be subject to equal tax
treatment.
Limiting the Tax Court's ability to hear denials ofrelief from the
operation of community income, creates geographical inequality.
Innocent spouses living in community property states who file a
separate return trying to protect themselves from joint and several
liability may still find themselves burdened with taxes on their share
of community income that they should not owe and will have
difficulty paying. Other innocent spouses may find themselves in the
same bind due to the joint and several liability for taxes reported on
ajoint return. Spouses living under any marital property regime have
an opportunity to seek relief from the Service. If they are denied that
relief, a spouse living in a community property state who files a
separate return cannot ask the Tax Court to review that denial, while
a spouse who files ajoint return can. Two individuals, in very similar
situations, have unequal relief under the current law. If Congress
wants to equalize the tax treatment of similarly situated taxpayers, it
must grant jurisdiction to the Tax Court to review denials of relief
from the effects of community property law in a stand-alone petition
brought by the taxpayer.
B. The DistrictCourtis Not a Valid Alternative to the Tax Court
In all cases in which the Service denies a taxpayer innocent
spouse relief under section 66 or 6015, the taxpayer seeking relief
may bring a claim before the United States district court or the Court
of Federal Claims. 4 ' Thus, even when the Tax Court lacks
jurisdiction to hear the case, every taxpayer denied innocent spouse
relief has another forum in which to seek review of that decision.
Taxpayers who filed a joint return and were denied relief from joint
and several liability can seek review of that decision from the Tax
Court, the United States district court, or the Court ofFederal Claims.
Taxpayers living in a community property state who filed separately
and seek relief from the rule of Poe v. Seaborncannot bring a claim
for review before the Tax Court except as a defense in a deficiency
proceeding.' 49 Their only remaining option is to file a suit in the
United States district court or the Court ofFederal Claims.

are identical in all other respects.).
148. See Nina J. Crimm, Tax Controversies:Choice of Forum, 9 B.U.J. Tax
Law 1(1991) (discussing the fora available to a litigant in a tax controversy); see
also Whitacre v. Comm'r, T.C. Summ. Op. 2003-21 (2003) (recognizing the other
fora available for Ms. Whitacre to seek review of her case).
149. Bernal v. Comm'r, 120 T.C. 102 (2003).
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Litigating a tax controversy in federal district court or the Court
of Federal Claims differs from bringing a claim before the Tax
Court. 5 ' The Tax Court is the only forum available to a taxpayer to
bring a claim without first paying the tax.'51 To bring a suit in either
the United States district court or the Court of Federal Claims, the
taxpayer must first pay the full amount oftax that the Service claims
is owed. 52 After payment of the tax, the taxpayer must file a claim
for a refund ofthe tax with the Service according to its procedures.'
The taxpayer cannot file a suit for refund of the tax until the Service
'
has denied the taxpayer's request for refund or has made a decision. 54
Finally, after exhausting remedies at the Service, the taxpayer may
file a suit for refund in the United States district court or Court of
Federal Claims, and the court will hear the case.
For taxpayers denied innocent spouse relief, suing in the district
court or Court of Federal Claims, while theoretically available, may
be practically impossible. In reality, ifthe taxpayer does not have the
means to pay the tax, paying the tax and then suing for a refund is not
a meaningful option. If the only forum available for the review of a
denial of relief from the rule ofPoe v. Seaborn is the district court or
Court ofFederal Claims, many taxpayers' claims may never be heard,
and many will never get "their day in court." Without Tax Court
jurisdiction, the provisions of the Code designed to help innocent
taxpayers who are being punished for someone else's understatement
will ultimately fail them.
Under section 6015, the Tax Court has jurisdiction to hear the
taxpayer's stand-alone petition for a review of a denial ofrelief from
joint and several liability.' 55 The taxpayer who filed ajoint return can
seek review of the denial without having to pay the tax owed.
Decisions to deny relief under this section will regularly be reviewed
by the Tax Court. Regular review will keep the Service from abusing
its discretion in these cases and arbitrarily denying valid claims for
relief from joint and several liability.
Under section 66, however, the Tax Court does not have
jurisdiction to review a denial of relief from the rule of Poe v.
Seaborn except when raised as a defense in a deficiency

150. See Crimm, supra note 148 (reviewing the differences among the fora
available for the litigation of a tax controversy).
151. See David Laro, The Evolution of the Tax Court as an Independent
Tribunal, 1995 U. Ill. L. Rev. 17, 18 (1995).
152. Crimm, supranote 148, at 64.
153. Id. at 65.
154. Id. at 66.
155. For a discussion of the jurisdiction of the Tax Court to review denials of
relief under section 6015, see suprasection II.A.
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proceeding.56 A taxpayer who cannot afford to pay the tax and sue
for a refund in district court or the Court of Federal Claims will not
be able to seek review of the Service's decision denying the taxpayer
reliefunder section 66. Iftaxpayers cannot seek review in such cases,
the Service will be free to deny relief with no fear that any court will
find that it abused its discretion. Innocent spouses seeking relief from
the rule ofPoe v. Seabornwill be subject to the whim of the Service,
trying to collect as much revenue as possible. Despite allegations by
some commentators that the Tax Court may be biased toward the
government and litigating before the court offers little help to
taxpayers,'57 Congress should give the Tax Court jurisdiction to
review denials of relief under section 66. Without Tax Court
jurisdiction, the decisions denying relief will rarely be reviewed at all.
The Tax Court may be a taxpayer's only chance to seek review.
Without Tax Court jurisdiction, the provision intended to protect
innocent spouses may offer little real protection.
VII. CONCLUSION

The Code failed Mary Ann Whitacre. Without a change in the
law, it will continue to fail other taxpayers in her situation. Section
66, offering relief from the effects of the rule of Poe v. Seaborn,
appears to offer help, but for Ms. Whitacre, it was nothing more than
a collection of words. Ms. Whitacre became subject to the sole
discretion of the Service, and the Service was accountable to no one.
Women and men in a position like Ms. Whitacre find themselves in
a no-win situation. They must pay the tax. If they still believe that
they should be given relief, they can sue for a refund before the
United States district court. Before coming before the district court,
however, they must find a way to pay.
Congress should give the Tax Court jurisdiction over denials of
relief from the operation of Poe v. Seaborn under section 66. This
solution would offer taxpayers a forum in the Tax Court by adding a
provision to section 66 reading, "The United States Tax Court shall
156. For a discussion of the jurisdiction of the Tax Court to review denials of
relief under section 66, see supra section II.B.
157. See Deborah A. Geier, The Tax Court, Article III, and the Proposal
Advanced by the Federal Courts Study Committee: A Study in Applied
ConstitutionalTheory, 76 Cornell L. Rev. 985. Other scholarly work seeks to
debunk the belief that the Tax Court is little more than a pawn for the government.
See Laro, supra note 151, at 24-28 (arguing that the Tax Court is biased neither
toward the government, nor toward the taxpayer). Whether the Tax Court is biased
toward the government or not, it may be the only forum available for taxpayers
finding themselves saddled with a tax liability that they cannot pay. These
taxpayers should at least have the chance to try to persuade the Tax Court to grant
relief where the Service has denied it.
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have jurisdiction to determine the appropriate relief in cases arising
under this section." Giving the Tax Court jurisdiction will not
guarantee reliefunder the section to taxpayers who do not qualify, but
it will guarantee judicial review of denials. It will help prevent the
Service from abusing its discretion and denying relief to deserving
taxpayers. Innocent spouses can look only to Congress for protection
from this injustice. Only Congress can expand the Tax Court's
jurisdiction, and it must expand it here to protect the rights of
innocent taxpayers.
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